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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis describes the design, implementation, and analysis of a distributed system
providing threat avoidance capability to mobile users. The system utilizes recent ad-
vances in wireless sensor networks to identify and localize threats, determine a safest
path between two locations, and guide a robot or person along the path. Unreli-
able communication, limited energy, and other limitations of sensor networks present
challenges in the design process and offer opportunities for optimization in different
scenarios.
This document is structured as follows: the introduction continues with back-
ground information detailing recent advances in the field of wireless sensor networks
and related applications. Motivation for this project and its specific contributions are
offered, and previous work in the field is discussed. The system's scope and design
is explained within the second chapter, and analysis of its algorithms follows in the
third. The final chapter details the functionality, architecture, and performance of an
implementation of the system using the TinyOS / Cricket v2 platform.
1.1 Background
The development of relatively inexpensive hardware for wireless sensor networks has
enabled many new distributed applications in recent years. Environmental monitor-
ing, battlefield awareness, and industrial control are some of areas that are already
13
benefiting from advances in this new technological field. A typical node in a wire-
less sensor network is equipped with a battery, a microcontroller, a low power radio,
a small amount of random access memory, and a collection of inexpensive sensors.
Each node can communicate with its neighbors, and typically forms an ad hoc mesh
network by acting as a router for the data of other nodes. Within the academic com-
munity, the mote platform developed at the University of California, Berkeley, has
become the standard in the academic community for prototyping and deploying new
sensor network applications. The motes run TinyOS [4], a lightweight, component-
based operating system that allows applications to be constructed from a combination
of modules. Using future generations of motes, researchers foresee the ability to de-
ploy networks containing thousands of nodes throughout buildings and cities and
integrate them with our preexisting communication infrastructure. Once in place,
these networks could aid in disaster recovery, decrease energy use, and provide new
insights into our world by monitoring environmental conditions. As the cost of build-
ing and deploying motes declines, we can expect to witness exciting new applications
of wireless sensor networks.
Despite their promise, sensor networks suffer from several technological limita-
tions and challenges. Radio-frequency (RF) communication is inherently unreliable,
and inconsistency over time ensures that applications will face a varying set of neigh-
bors they can communicate with. The reliance on battery power ensures we must
design applications that conserve energy and tolerate failures of random nodes. We
must also be aware of the limited processing power available at each node; in many
cases, analysis of data gathered by a network must be performed later on a powerful,
centralized computer. Communication bandwidth is also in short supply-nodes in
geographic proximity must share the same channel over time, regardless of whether
their broadcasts are intended for each other. Some of these issues may be ameliorated
in the future with technological advances, but most will likely remain as constraints
to be faced by application designers.
Looking forward, the increased feasibility of real-world sensor network deploy-
ments promises to allow a broader range of practical applications. In military set-
14
tings, temporary networks will likely provide intelligence on battlefields of the future,
and office buildings may benefit from improved security and more sensitive HVAC
systems. Environment researchers hope to develop less invasive observation tech-
niques with sensor networks, and some success has already been had in this area
[8]. Proponents of ubiquitous computing envision a world in which networked sensors
surround and improve our daily life-the prescience of this vision may depend more
on commercial limitations than technological ones. Regardless, it is likely that the
power conservation, localization, and routing algorithms developed in recent years
will be fundamental elements of future applications .
1.2 Motivation
The introduction of sensor networks to motion planning and threat avoidance sce-
narios is a natural extension of previous work. The possibility of distributed sensor
nodes providing intelligence to a mobile agent has applications in many scenarios. For
instance, a network that can identify heat in a burning building can be programmed
to quickly find and disseminate the best escape routes to its occupants. Similarly,
a network capable of recognizing enemy movement and determining relatively safe
locations and routes in an urban warfare setting could provide real-time feedback to
soldiers. Robots exploring treacherous natural environments could be aided by an ad
hoc network, even if deployed haphazardly. Beyond these scenarios, improved algo-
rithms for motion planning and path discovery have the potential to find widespread
use as sensor networks become more cost effective and feasible for new applications.
1.3 Contributions
The primary contributions of this work lie in the techniques used to model threats,
the algorithms for discovering safest paths, an analysis of the system's performance,
and a prototype implementation. Briefly, paths are evaluated with a unique "survival
probability" metric that is influenced by the severity of the threats as well as the
15
length of the path they affect. Each threat contributes to a model that approximates
the likelihood of survival when a mobile user is traveling through the space covered by
the network. The system takes advantage of the unique capabilities of sensor networks
by performing local computation and optimizing partial paths in the background. A
unique method for generating a discrete set of points to cover the space ensures that
we search in regions with the lowest threat intensity. The path search technique is a
back propagation algorithm that uses dynamic programming to discover an optimal
path.
1.4 Related Work
Several techniques have been developed to allow robots to translate qualitative in-
structions into specific movements, a challenge generally referred to as the motion
planning problem. It is described in more depth in [6]. Recent advances in navigation
using sensor networks draw on one or more of the following techniques. Roadmap
methods attempt to simplify the search space into a connectivity graph that can
then be searched using traditional algorithms such as A*. Of course, the size of the
paths in the graph must be large enough to accommodate the robot. Planning meth-
ods utilizing exact cell decomposition attempt to subdivide the space into adjacent,
non-overlapping cells that can be combined to construct paths. Approximate cell
decomposition methods are similar, except they only provide an approximation of
the search space and are more prevalent in practice because they are easier to im-
plement and more tolerant of geometric errors. Finally, potential field methods take
an iterative approach and typically rely on the robot sensing danger or obstacles in
real-time. After calculating a potential field according to the sum of attractive or
repulsive forces, the robot moves some incremental distance in the best direction.
Rather than guaranteeing success in reaching a long distance goal, potential field
methods are best suited for local movements where efficiency is important.
Recent work in robot navigation has focused on several challenges. In monitoring
and security applications, mobile robots may be asked to cover a large, unfamiliar
16
environment as efficiently as possible. While some coverage applications require a
static pattern of movement, others demand that that robots react dynamically to
changes in the environment. For instance, the topology may be changing rapidly due
to an emergency situation and robots must cover the entire network and track those
changes. As a precursor to the coverage problem, robots may also be charged with
deploying a sensor network and must be able to intelligently place sensors as they
travel. In all cases, robots must be able to discern between previously explored and
new regions, a process aided by deploying a series of markers or sensors.
Once a sensor network has been deployed, it can be used as a communication
medium for robots and people in its vicinity. Nodes can collaborate to help a robot
navigate its surroundings and travel between points in the network. Early work al-
lowed robots to lay trails of sensors behind them that could be followed later [10].
Later research allowed sensor networks to determine the best series of nodes to follow
in order to travel between locations and then advise a mobile robot where to move
in real-time [2]. Such navigation can be done probabilistically by choosing the inter-
mediate sensors with the best chance of leading to the goal using a technique known
as Value Iteration. The utility derived from transitions between nodes forms a basis
for computing and then maximizing the expected gain in utility for any movement.
In this model, the navigation strategy can be viewed as a Markov decision process
where the robot moves from one sensor to another [1]. In order to develop a thorough
understanding of the spatial relationships between different sensor nodes, the robot
must traverse the network several times before navigation can begin.
Strategies similar to the work presented in this thesis for utilizing a sensor network
to plan routes for a user in a dangerous environment have also been developed. To
tackle this problem, the network must be capable of identifying and localizing threats.
Researchers have advocated using a potential field method where a measurement of
danger can be propagated throughout the network and used to plan routes [7]. As the
user travels through the network, virtual attractive and repulsive forces ensure that
the safest path is followed in real-time. In a different scenario, the potential field can
be used to plan a safest route using dynamic programming. The network responds
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to a request for a path by building progressively longer partial paths from the source
to the goal. In this scenario, when a sensor node receives a partial path it adds the
danger level at its location and forwards a partial path assuming it has not already
forwarded a path with a lower aggregated danger level.
Similar work has investigated using a sensor network to guide an autonomous
model helicopter [3]. The authors took a path-oriented approach, where the helicopter
is viewed as a mobile node that can request a route to a goal location. Using a control
algorithm, localized sensor nodes establish whether they lie along the path according
to their location and the path width, and then they guide the helicopter through their
potential field as it travels along the route. The fidelity of the approach is limited by
the distribution of the nodes, because paths must be constructed using node locations
as intermediate points.
1.5 Comparative Analysis
The primary advantages of the approach presented in this thesis lie in the sophistica-
tion of the survival probability metric and the search technique. Unlike a technique
of summing a measure of the threat, the survival probability metric offers a more
accurate evaluation of the fitness of a path. We are able to concatenate paths by
multiplying their survival probabilities, a process used often in the back propagation
algorithm. Mathematically, the multiplication is equivalent to evaluating the prob-
ability a user survives a journey along the second path, given that he or she has
successfully completed a journey along the first path. An ideal path search algorithm
would have minimal latency and reliably find the path with the highest possible sur-
vival probability through the continuous space. Given the communication, sensing,
and computational limitations of a sensor network, we must make sacrifices in these
metrics. As shown in Chapter 4, the latency and reliability of our approach com-
pares favorably with other strategies. The set of discrete points we will search from
are chosen in a distributed manner, with each node evaluating the best position for
points in its local space. Furthermore, survival probabilities for small paths between
18
these points are pre-computed, allowing the back propagation algorithm to efficiently
combine these paths from node to node across the network. The local computation
takes advantage of the distributed processing power available in a sensor network and
enables a finer grained search than other methods allow. In scenarios where several
threats are present, iterative approaches to motion planning may recommend paths
that become "trapped" between several threats, as will be illustrated later. The
back propagation algorithm avoids this problem by searching the entire space before
recommending a path.
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Chapter 2
System Design
The architecture of the threat avoidance system and its component algorithms is
described in the subsequent sections.
2.1 Overview
We assume a two-dimensional field covered by a collection of connected sensor nodes
arranged in random locations. Each node can communicate unreliably via packet
radio with its neighbors, depending on the density and arrangement of the nodes.
Our goal is to enable the sensor nodes to offer real time navigation instructions and
path planning to a mobile robot or person traveling in the field. At any given time,
the sensor field may contain one or more threats. We assume the sensors on each node
can reliably detect these threats within some radius. In order to provide navigation
instructions and guide mobile users, we must develop algorithms to solve the following
problems:
" Model the affects of the threats on users traveling in the space covered by the
network
" Detect and localize threats and ensure awareness throughout the network
" Discover the safest route for a user to follow in response to a request
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* Guide the user along the path in real time
2.1.1 Assumptions
A shared coordinate system on the sensor nodes is an important pre-condition for the
threat avoidance system. Nearly all algorithms discussed later make use of this foun-
dation. For instance, nodes that detect a threat must be able to collaborate with their
neighbors to estimate its location and then distribute that information to different
regions of the network. Localization in sensor networks has been studied extensively
in recent years, and techniques exist for developing a shared coordinate system. In
some instances, a subset of the sensors are equipped with GPS or seeded with static
coordinates, while other strategies rely on inter-sensor ranging data and multilater-
ation algorithms. Inter-sensor ranging capability requires specialized hardware, such
as the Cricket platform, to perform time distance of arrival (TDOA) measurements.
2.2 Threat Model
The sensor nodes making up our network store a distributed model of the threats
they are capable of detecting. This model describes how threats affect users traveling
through the field covered by the network, and therefore allows sensor nodes to evaluate
the relative safety of paths. We base the threat model on a survival probability metric-
for any path through the space covered by the network we calculate the likelihood
that a mobile user following it will complete the journey successfully. The model is
supported by a collection of functions that address the following challenges:
" Evaluate the survival probability when traveling a unit distance at some radius,
r, from a threat
" Aggregate this calculation to support situations when multiple threats are present
" Allow travel distances other than the unit distance
" Support the concatenation and extension of paths
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We begin by modeling the survival probability, s, when traveling a unit distance
at a radius r away from a threat by the following relationship:
s = 1 - b - -d-r (2.1)
where b and d are constants dependent on the specific threat. The graph in Figure
2-1 demonstrates how this relationship is realized in practice.
1.2
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
Figure 2-1: The relationship between survival probability and distance in the model.
When multiple threats affect a region of the network, we aggregate their effects
by multiplying the survival probabilities calculated from their respective distances
to the region. Each successive multiplication step is equivalent to calculating the
probability a user will survive the effects of that threat, conditioned on surviving the
threats already incorporated in the calculation. More formally, the calculation for
multiple threats can be expressed as
s= 1 - bi (2.2)
iEthreats
To allow for travel distances other the unit distance, we can convert the survival
probability using an exponent. For example, if i is the length specified by the original
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relationship and la is the actual length needed in practice, the survival probability is
S J 1- ed) (2.3)
iEthreats
Intuitively, this calculation is the equivalent of conditioning the survival of each ad-
ditional unit distance of travel on the successful completion of the previous portion
of the journey.
Assuming a sensor node has been informed of the threats detected by the network,
it can perform the aggregation itself and calculate survival probabilities of short paths
through the area near its location. To extend the calculation to a longer path, we
multiply the probabilities of its component segments. As with the modification from
the unit distance, this computation can be viewed as the conditional likelihood of a
user surviving an additional distance, given that it has traveled successfully so far.
If we were to view the calculation in the limit as the length of the unit distance
approaches zero (and the constants in the survival probability function are modified),
we are effectively calculating a product integral of survival probabilities along the
path.
The ability to aggregate the effects of multiple threats, calculate a survival prob-
ability for a path of arbitrary length, and combine the survival probabilities of two
or more paths is used extensively within the path discovery algorithms.
2.3 Threat Detection and Awareness
The ability to enable complex distributed applications using relatively unsophisticated
hardware is one of the advantages of wireless sensor networks. We use a binary
detection model and estimate the position of the threat by calculating the centroid of
locations of the sensors that have detected it. This strategy generalizes to different
kinds of threats, and fits well with inexpensive sensors. Furthermore, it produces
more accurate results as the number of sensors detecting the threat increases. Sensor
failures due to the threat may be likely in some cases, but nodes along the edge of
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the afflicted region will continue with detection.
In practice, the centroid calculation requires collaboration between all of the sen-
sors detecting the threat. We assume that the maximum sensor detection range is
substantially smaller than the radio communication range. Leader election algorithms
for tracking applications in sensor networks are well suited for this task, and the one
developed by Nagpal and Coore is appropriate [9]. Briefly, when a node detects a
threat, it waits a random period of time before assigning the threat a unique identifi-
cation number and then broadcasts a group invitation message to its neighbors. Each
of them that has also detected the threat responds with a update message. Pseudo
code for the process once a detection is made is shown in Figure 2-2.
if status = NO-GROUP then
if heard a leader broadcast recently then
status <- FOLLOWER
broadcast follower update message
else
start leader election countdown timer
end if
else if status = LEADER then
broadcast leader update message
else if status = FOLLOWER then
broadcast follower update message
end if
Figure 2-2: Pseudo code for the response to a threat detection. The status variable
is initially NO.GROUP.
If the leader election countdown timer expires, the node declares itself a leader
and sends an update message. When other nodes receive this message, they note that
they have heard a leader broadcast recently and stop their leader election countdown
timer if it is running. In the case where the leader bails out, the group dissolves and
each member begins a random countdown before broadcasting an invitation to join a
new group. In this scenario, a node that is beyond radio range of the group leader will
attempt to initiate another group. We minimize communication by not allowing any
node to be a member of more than one group simultaneously. This decision ensures
that a threat detected over a wide area of the network will be reported in multiple
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locations. Pseudo code for the response to no detection is shown in Figure 2-3.
if status = LEADER then
broadcast leader bailout message
status <- NO-GROUP
else if status = FOLLOWER then
broadcast follower bailout message
status <- NO-GROUP
end if
Figure 2-3: Pseudo code for the response to no threat detection.
Periodically, the group leader computes the threat location by calculating the
centroid of the locations of all the nodes in the group. After each calculation, the
leader broadcasts its own identification number, the location of the threat, and a se-
quence number so neighbors can distinguish between repeated broadcasts. Neighbors
rebroadcast threat awareness messages if the survival probability of a user traveling
at their location could be impacted by the threat. In this way, we achieve a con-
trolled, local flood without impacting areas of the network unaffected by the threat.
The leader identification number allows remote nodes to avoid duplicating threats
and remove stale threats after a period of time.
2.4 Search Space
Discovering the safest path through the field covered by the network requires a dis-
tributed search algorithm. Naively, this is a search through a continuous plane that is
intractable given the computational limits of a sensor network. In order to decrease
the computation involved, we must choose a subset of the points in the field as our
search space. Paths will be constructed incrementally using these points as inter-
mediate locations. Rather than select static sensor node locations as these points,
we can achieve better results with a dynamic set of points that shift in reaction to
threats. By locating individual points in areas of lower threat intensity, we increase
the chance that the best path we find will have a higher survival probability.
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2.4.1 Midpoint Shifting
The improvement realized by allowing the set of search points to shift is dependent
on many factors. A higher spatial density of sensors increases the likelihood that
their locations will fall in areas where travel is safer, but a higher density of threats
increases the need for a more sophisticated placement of points. The classic scenario
we wish to avoid is one where sensor locations clustered around threats prevent us
from discovering an optimal path that bisects the threats. More generally, shifted
points will improve the survival probability of a path and allow us to approach the
optimal solution that would be found if the continuous space were searched. Figure
2-4 demonstrates the benefits that can be realized from using shifted midpoints rather
than node locations as steps along the path.
4 Threat
Node
Midpoint
Optimal Path
Figure 2-4: Benefits in coverage using midpoint shifting. Note that the optimal path
lies roughly along the perpendicular bisector of the line connecting the locations of
the threats.
Our strategy will be to incorporate one search point for each pair of neighbor-
ing sensor nodes. Each node will be jointly responsible for the location of a point
between itself and each of its neighbors. The default location for each point is the
geometric midpoint between the two sensor locations. Ideally, we would like to shift
each midpoint so that it is located at the point with the lowest threat intensity in the
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local area. In practice, however, we only see substantial benefits near regions which
roughly bisect the two threat locations-we would prefer midpoints to lie as close to the
perpendicular bisector of the line connecting the threat locations as possible. Each
node that is aware of at least two threats shifts its midpoints to the perpendicular
bisector, but only if the shift is a less than a specified distance away from the default
location. To account for variations in node density, we specify this maximum shift
distance as a quarter of the distance between the neighbors. Figure 2-5 illustrates an
example shift, and Figure 2-6 contains pseudo code for the shifting process.
Threat
Node
* Default Midpoint
Node
Shifted Midpoint
Threat
Figure 2-5: An illustration of a midpoint shift. The shifted midpoint lies in a relatively
safer position, and will create a path of higher survival probability than if it were in
the default location. Note that the midpoint is shifted in the direction matching the
slope of the line connecting the threats.
2.4.2 Survival Probability Maintenance
Several unique properties of sensor networks influence our search strategy. The com-
putational power of sensor nodes is plentiful relative to their communication band-
width. Computation also consumes far less energy and can proceed in the background
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(dx, dy) -- geometric midpoint of your location and neighbor i
(tx, ty) <- geometric midpoint of two nearest threat locations
s <- slope of line connecting two nearest threats
mx <- (tx + s * ty + s2 * dx - s * dy)/(s 2 + 1)
my <- s * (mx - dx) + dy
distance <- distance from (dx, dy) to (mx, my)
maxDistance <- (distance from your location to neighbor i) / 4
if distance < maxDistance then
midpoint for neighbor i +- (mx, my)
else
midpoint for neighbor i *- (dx, dy)
end if
Figure 2-6: Pseudo code for calculating and storing the midpoint location for neighbor
i. (dx, dy) is the default midpoint location and (mx, my) is the proposed shifted
midpoint, calculated by finding the intersection of the perpendicular bisector and a
line through the default midpoint with the same slope as the line connecting the two
nearest threats.
without interfering with other responsibilities of the threat avoidance application. For
this reason, each node maintains a calculation of the survival probability associated
with a path between each pair of its midpoints. Each of these segments corresponds
with a connection between a pair of neighbors, and will be used to build longer, com-
plete paths from neighbor to neighbor at the user's request. Each node is able to
periodically recompute the survival probabilities between each pair of points without
additional communication with its neighbors. Among other benefits, this strategy
allows paths to be assembled more quickly because the necessary computation has
already been performed. Each node is responsible only for its local area, and we are
able to harness the distributed computational power of the network. As discussed
earlier, path aggregation is straightforward-the probability that a user will survive
a journey along a longer path can be quickly calculated by multiplying the survival
probabilities of its segments.
Building this functionality requires several functions. spAtPoint, shown in Figure
2-7, is an implementation of Equation 2.2 and calculates the survival probability for
a user traveling a unit distance at a location.
In order to calculate the survival probability of a path between two locations, we
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spAtPoint(x, y)
sp <- 1
for i = 0 to numberOf Threats - 1 do
distance <- distance from (x, y) to threat i's location
sp <- sp * (1 - b - ed-distance)
end for
return sp
Figure 2-7: Pseudo code for calculating the survival probability of a path of unit
distance at a point. The constants b and d are dependent on the specific threat.
average the survival probabilities at the locations using spAtPoint, and then adjust
for the distance between the points as specified by Equation 2.3. The pseudo code
for this operation is shown in Figure 2-8.
spBetweenPoints(xl, yl, x2, y2 )
sp1 < spAtPoint(x1, yl)
sp2 -- spAtPoint(x2, y2)
sp <- (spl + sp2)/2
distance <- distance from (xl, yl) to (x2, y2)
distanceRatio <- distance/ UNIT-.DISTANCE
return spdistanceRatio
Figure 2-8: Pseudo code for calculating the survival probability of a path between
(xl, yl) and (x2, y2).
Finally, we must build a table of records for each pair of midpoints, as shown in
Figure 2-9.
for i = 0 to numberOf Neighbors - 1 do
for j = i to numberOf Neighbors - 1 do
insert(id of neighbor i, id of neighbor j, spBetweenPoints(xi, yi, x,, yj))
end for
end for
Figure 2-9: Pseudo code to store survival probability calculations between each pair
of midpoints. (xi, yi) is the midpoint with neighbor i, and (xj, yj) is the midpoint
with neighbor j.
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2.5 Path Construction
Making use of the pre-computed segment survival probabilities stored in records, the
network can discover the optimal path between any two arbitrary points covered by
the sensor field using a back propagation algorithm. Initially, the network routes a
path request originated by the user to the node nearest the destination. This node
initiates the back propagation by calculating and sending the survival probability
of segments connecting the destination with each of its midpoints. Each segment is
the beginning of a possible path back to the origin. When each neighbor receives
the path reply containing a set of advertisements, it first selects the partial path to
its midpoint. To create the reply it will send, it builds a new set of advertisements
by adding segments from the midpoint to each of its other midpoints. The survival
probabilities of these segments have been pre-calculated, and can be appended quickly
to form advertisements for each of its neighbors. Pseudo code for this process is
shown in 2-10. Figure 2-11 illustrates this step in the reply process, as the current
node extends the path from the midpoint of one neighbor to the midpoints of its other
neighbors.
sp +- survival probability of path * survival probability in advertisement
store ids of nodes along path so far and append your own
for all i in set of neighbor ids such that i $ id of sender do
lookup survival probability and store as advertisement for neighbor i
end for
Figure 2-10: Pseudo code for building a set of advertisements to neighbors in a reply
message. The node must concatenate the survival probability of the short path to its
midpoint with the rest of the path built so far before creating the new reply message.
We judge the fitness of a reply based on highest survival probability, followed by
lowest hop count in the event of a tie. The decision of whether to forward a reply
message involves several issues. If the node initiated a request that resulted in the
reply, there is no need to forward-the reply can be stored if it is optimal. Naturally,
a node does not forward a reply message if it has previously forwarded a better one.
Pseudo code for the process that ensues when a reply message is received is shown in
Figure 2-12.
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Path
Advertisement
Node
Path
Current
Node
Figure 2-11: Path extension within the back propagation algorithm. The current
node includes the survival probability of each extended path in its message.
sp <- survival probability of path * survival probability in advertisement
if sp is the optimal reply to a request made by this node then
store sp and the ids of the nodes along the path
else if sp is the optimal reply this node has received for this request then
build advertisements for this reply and broadcast the message
end if
Figure 2-12: Pseudo code for the path advertisement forwarding process.
Due to the nature of the construction algorithm, the user may receive multiple
paths, each with higher survival probability than the last. Because of this, the user
should wait a period of time after a path arrives before declaring it optimal, in
case a better path is received soon after. Once the period of time expires, the user
broadcasts a path selection message which neighbors continue to forward if they have
previously forwarded a path advertisement. This message serves the dual purpose of
instructing nodes to stop forwarding path advertisements, and notifying those nodes
whose midpoints make up the path that they will be responsible for guiding the user.
The construction algorithm will fail if communication failures prevent any paths
from being extended back to the user. With multiple potential paths being extended
simultaneously, this situation is unlikely. Regardless, we can ensure that it does not
occur by having nodes rebroadcast their path advertisements if they do not overhear
any of their neighbors forwarding on the advertisement. Although we cannot guar-
antee the optimal path will be found in all circumstances, this strategy will mitigate
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the result when messages are dropped.
2.6 User Guidance
After the user initiates an activation message, the nodes along the path form an active
group responsible for helping the user navigate between midpoints. In practice, the
user will be equipped with a specialized node capable of ranging to other nodes in
the network. As the user travels through the space covered by the network, the
specialized node emits coordinated acoustic and RF signals that nearby nodes can
use to calculate their distance to the user. These distances, as well as the locations of
the nodes and their midpoints, are returned to the specialized node in a radio packet.
At any given time, the user can estimate its own location using a collection of recent
distances and locations. The estimation is done using a multilateration algorithm
that refines an initial estimate through several iterations. The initial estimate used
in this case is the centroid of the node locations, and pseudo code for the algorithm is
shown in Figure 2-13. In the case of a human user, an interactive application displays
the locations of nodes, midpoints along the path, and the user's estimated location in
real time. The application also provides an interface for requesting paths, evaluating
incoming replies, and selecting a path to follow.
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N < number of recently reporting nodes
h +- height of node traveling with user
e +- centroid of the locations of the recently reporting nodes
while better estimate is desired do
for j = 1 to N do
dj <-distance from nr to e
f+ - v/dj -O h2 _||ni _ e|I|
g (nj-e)g inj-ell
A[j] +- gj
b[j] +-- -f? + gi-
end for
e +-- A-' -b
end while
return e
Figure 2-13: Pseudo code for the multilateration algorithm. The while loop reflects
the logic involved in the calculation; five iterations are sufficient in most cases. nr is
the location of node j. A contains N rows and is a matrix of two dimensional vectors.
b is a one dimensional matrix of N rows.
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Chapter 3
Analysis and Modeling
Developing a framework for analyzing how well the system will perform in varying
situations is an important addition to the design offered above. The following sections
present analysis of various aspects of the system.
3.1 Threat Localization and Awareness
The accuracy of our threat localization technique is influenced by several factors.
Chief among these are the detection radius of a typical sensor and the spatial density
of sensor locations in the network. The group formation algorithm discussed earlier
also influences accuracy, as it results in one threat location for each group of sensors
reporting to a leader. In cases where a threat exists over a large, continuous area,
several locations will be reported. When calculating the centroid of sensor locations
to estimate the threat location, our approximation will tend to improve with each
additional sensor that has detected the threat. Concentrating on the case where a
threat can be modeled by a point in the plane and results in only one calculated
location, we will examine the relationship between spatial density and the sensor
detection radius with the error likely to result from the centroid calculation.
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3.1.1 Localization Model
We model sensor locations as a continuous spatial poisson process with parameter A
and assume a threat detection radius of rD. In reality, the detection radius will vary
across sensors and time, but using rD as the mean of the distribution of detection
radii improves tractability without sacrificing the result. By the properties of a spatial
poisson process, the probability of exactly s sensors detecting a threat is given by
P(s = k) - (Afrk!A e D fork = 0,1, 2,...
It follows that the expected number of sensors detecting a threat is
E[s] = A7r2
Once a detection has been made and the centroid calculated, we know the actual
location of the threat is located in the set of locations within the detection radii of
each sensor. Figure 3-1 illustrates this situation, and provides some intuition on how
uncertainty declines with the number of sensors detecting the threat. In general, with
a linear increase in network density, detections are expected to rise linearly as well.
3.1.2 Awareness
The likelihood that all of the sensors within the region affected by a threat maintain
consistent knowledge over time is influenced by several factors. The spatial density
of sensor locations is directly related to this probability, as each node will have more
opportunities to hear a report of the threat location as its neighbors increase. Simi-
larly, increased RF transmission range will also increase the likelihood of consistency.
Depending on the amount of communication traffic in the network, the frequency that
group leaders broadcast threat locations is also relevant as it influences the amount
of congestion in the local area.
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Figure 3-1: A visual representation of threat localization error. The circles repre-
sent sensor locations, the square the actual location of the threat, and the triangle
the centroid. The area of the region where the four circles intersect represents the
magnitude of the uncertainty.
3.2 Threat Model and Survival Probability
The survival probability metric coupled with a back propagation algorithm is one of
several possible methods for selecting the optimal path given a series of threats. We
examine other possibilities in this section and discuss their performance in various
scenarios.
3.2.1 Iterative Gradient Descent
Rather than attempt to discover a path through back propagation, users may move
iteratively through the field without long term planning. Typically, the direction of
each step would be determined by a goal-seeking heuristic that attempts to maintain
the maximum distance from the nearest threat. This strategy can be executed pre-
cisely with a localized network, but hop counts could serve as a proxy for distance
if localization capability did not exist. In situations where few threats exist in the
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Threat
Path Path
Origin Destination
Optimal
Path
Figure 3-2: An example of a pitfall of the iterative gradient descent method. A user
performing gradient descent is likely to follow the horizontal path, rather than travel
around all three threats.
network, it is possible that this strategy could be less time consuming than waiting
for back propagation to complete. Unfortunately, as it is performing a form of gra-
dient descent, the strategy is likely to suffer from a local minima problem-without
"looking ahead" it may lead users to inappropriate locations when multiple threats
are present. Figure 3-2 illustrates a scenario where the problem rises; an optimal
path around the threats is not likely to be found with an iterative method. As will
be demonstrated below, the strategy of shifting midpoints between nodes whose lo-
cations approximately bisect threat locations creates optimal paths locally similar to
those created by the iterative approach, but without the local minima problem.
3.2.2 Alternative Threat Representations
In order to evaluate the relative safety of a path, we can imagine adding a measure of
the threat at each point on the path, rather than taking a product integral of survival
probabilities. The summation procedure would take the form of a traditional integral,
and could be implemented using the familiar back propagation algorithm. Intuitively,
it does not distinguish between a severe threat encountered for a short distance and a
less severe one present along a longer path. While total survival probability declines
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exponentially with path length and threat intensity, the sum increases linearly as the
path is extended or threats become more numerous. These two formulations may give
similar results in many circumstances, but the survival probability metric is a more
precise comparative measure of paths.
3.2.3 Midpoint Shifting
In order to justify the added computation and communication necessary to maintain
optimal midpoint locations, it is important to examine the benefits of this process.
The alternative is to naively select potential points to build paths from; sensor lo-
cations are a logical choice because no additional messaging is needed to maintain
location state, but any strategy of selecting random locations should produce equiva-
lent results. Intuitively, the shifted midpoints strategy is advantageous when sensors
are located near threats, or in networks with low density and therefore fewer points
to build paths from.
Analysis of the following simple example quantifies the advantage of the midpoint
shifting process. As shown in Figure 3-3, we have threats located at (5, -5) and (5,
5) and a path request from (0, 0) to (10, 0). Sensor nodes are arranged randomly
according to a spatial poisson process with parameter A,. Possible sensor locations
are shown in the figure, but these are only representative. The straight line bisecting
the threats along the origin demonstrates the result when the path is constructed
with shifted midpoints-before back propagation occurs, sensors will be able to locate
points in areas of highest survival probability and form an optimal path. The line
connecting sensor locations represents an inferior path, but the best possible given
the locations. As before, we model the survival probability at a distance r from a
threat as
s = 1 - b- e-dr
We are interested in developing an intuition for the difference in survival probabil-
ities of the optimal and inferior paths. To calculate this value, we will first determine
the expected vertical distance of each sensor location along the inferior path from the
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Figure 3-3: Example for midpoint shift analysis
x-axis. In order to ensure the problem is tractable we must assume a threshold of rT
units beyond which every sensor has no neighbors. According to the spatial poisson
process, each sensor's neighbors are distributed randomly within a circle of radius rT
centered at its location (we therefore expect A,7rr2 neighbors). To simulate the result
of the back propagation algorithm, we form the inferior path by iteratively selecting,
among the neighbors closer to the origin, the one closest to the x-axis.
We can very closely approximate the expectation, E[y], of the vertical distance
of the selected node from the x-axis by developing a probability density function for
the vertical component of its location. We know it will lie within RT horizontally,
and the following expression relates the probability that k sensors will appear in a
rectangle of width RT and height 2y (above or below the x axis):
P(k) (AsRT2y)ke-ASRT
2y
k!
We are only interested in the sensor nearest the x axis, so the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) of the smallest vertical distance is given by
FD(y) = 1 - e 2ASRTy
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Taking the derivative, the PDF is
fd(y) = 2ASRTe -2RTY
The expectation, therefore, is
E[y] = 2AsRTye-2,SRTYdy =1/00 2AsRT
This series of steps tells us that we can expect a discrepancy of 2 from the2ASRT
ideal path at each sensor location along the inferior path. The difference in survival
probability calculated at each step along the path is then
rl 1 -bi -ek - 1 1 -bi - e
iEthreats iEthreats
where r' is the absolute distance to threat i given an expected vertical shift of 1i 2ART
from the optimal path.
3.3 Performance and Scaling Issues
Given the limited communication and computation resources inherent in wireless sen-
sor networks, it is important that we understand how the algorithms presented earlier
scale. Our inputs to the system include the number of threats, the frequency of path
requests by users, and the size (number of nodes and spatial density) of the network.
Unlike in a traditional single processor computation model, we must be concerned
with communication bandwidth utilized, energy expended, and computational com-
plexity. The relation between these factors and overall system performance is not
straightforward. Given the distributed nature of the system, communication in one
geographic area of the network has no impact outside the broadcast radius. Simi-
larly, excessive energy consumption leading to failures of individual sensor nodes has
the potential to inhibit overall system performance, but the effect is unpredictable,
especially if failure is correlated with geographic position. Our strategy will be to
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examine the effects of the individual algorithms and then aggregate the results.
3.3.1 Detection and Awareness
The threat detection and awareness algorithms are employed whenever a threat is
found by a set of sensors. Each is affected by the number of threats present and the
network's density; path requests and network size do not influence the performance of
the algorithms. For each threat, the detection algorithm creates a continuous series
of local communication as nodes report to a leader who approximates the threat's
location. Periodic announcements are flooded to nodes in the network within a fixed
radius-as far as the threat affects the survival probability of a user traveling in the
region. Consequently, each additional threat creates a fixed amount of communication
for detection and awareness. As the density of nodes in a given area increases, the
communication facilitating detection and flooding will rise proportionately.
3.3.2 Path Construction
The cost in terms of communication and energy consumption of the path construction
algorithm is very significant, as it potentially involves a large percentage of the nodes
in the network. Although additional threats do not impact the cost of running back
propagation, the size and density of the network are important factors. Preventing
nodes from advertising their path extensions when there is no possibility they will
contribute to an optimal path is an important step. Clearly, frequency of path requests
is the most important factor in this case, and network overload is a possibility if
repeated requests are made in a short timeframe.
3.3.3 Conclusion
Although the path planning and threat avoidance application requires several algo-
rithms and substantial resources, it is important to note that only the path construc-
tion component requires additional time to complete with larger network size. The
threat detection, midpoint shifting, and survival probability algorithms run in local
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areas and are not inhibited by larger networks. Because of the nature of the applica-
tion, energy consumption is a difficult issue to tackle-we must maintain a sufficient
number of aware sensors throughout the network over time so we can be confident of
reliable threat detection. In the absence of a coordinated sleeping algorithm, incor-
porating future power saving features in hardware may be our best strategy.
3.4 Failure Tolerance
By using a wireless sensor network as a platform, it is likely our algorithms will be
exposed to random hardware and communication failures. While the frequency of the
malfunctions will depend on factors specific to the deployment, we should expect a
fraction of the nodes to have failed at any given time. A time-varying radio frequency
(RF) environment for communication renders predictions about which nodes received
a particular message difficult to make. We make a distinction between sets of failures
that are uncorrelated over space and time, and those that are correlated and thus
possibly (in some cases) the result of a threat in one region of the network or an
indication that all nodes are losing power. Ensuring our high level algorithms tolerate
random issues facing a small percentage of the network is a reasonable goal, but it
may be impossible to recover from highly correlated failures.
3.4.1 Node Failures
From a global perspective, node failures have the general effect of decreasing the av-
erage neighborhood size in the network. While this change may hurt the performance
of the system by decreasing the expected number of nodes detecting a threat and
the number of midpoints making up the search space, we should ensure the algo-
rithms described in Chapter 2 are likely to recover from unexpected node failures.
In particular, failures of the leader node within the detection algorithm will result in
a reelection once the surrounding nodes purge the outdated leader announcements
from their table. Failing follower nodes will be purged from the leader's centroid
calculation, leading to a situation where malfunctions concentrated in a local area
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would adversely affect detection capability. Within the midpoint shifting algorithm,
failing nodes reduce the number of potential points covering the space but do not
introduce inconsistencies as their neighbors drop them over time. A malfunction on
the back propagation and user guidance algorithms can be problematic if it occurs
within a narrow time window. Once the user has selected the optimal path and begins
traveling, a failure among the nodes responsible for guidance could prove difficult to
recover from.
3.4.2 Link Failures
The affect of unpredictable link failures on the system represent a more subtle and dif-
ficult issue to analyze. By the nature of wireless sensor networks, communication links
will nearly always appear to fade in and out as the RF environment changes over time
in the network. Furthermore, temporary problems such as collisions and more per-
manent issues like hidden nodes present difficulties. Within the detection algorithm,
the presence of temporary failures ensures that we strike a balance between purging
outdated followers and leaders, and waiting several cycles to determine whether it is
merely a temporary communication problem. Repeated threat awareness broadcasts
by a leader help to ensure that all nodes within the area affected by the threat remain
up to date. Similarly, repeated broadcasts within the back propagation algorithm help
to ensure link failures do not prevent the optimal path from being returned to the
user.
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Chapter 4
Implementation and Results
This chapter presents an implementation of the threat avoidance and path planning
system on the Cricket v2 hardware using the TinyOS programming environment.
4.1 Platform Description
This section offers an overview of the hardware and software platform used to imple-
ment the threat avoidance system.
4.1.1 Hardware
The Cricket platform provides a foundation for ubiquitous computing and sensor
network applications by offering real time location information to mobile users. De-
signed by members of the Networks and Mobile Systems group at MIT, individual
Crickets measure approximately 9.5 cm long by 3.8 cm wide by 3.2 cm high and are
powered by 2 AA batteries. They can serve as replacements for traditional motes in
sensor network applications. Briefly, each Cricket contains an Atmel ATMega128L
microcontroller with 128Kb of program memory and 4Kb of RAM, an RS232 serial
interface, a ChipCon CC1000 radio, the ability to send and receive ultrasound signals,
three LEDs, and several sensors. These components were chosen to support range
measurements between a pair of crickets using a time distance of arrival (TDOA)
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Figure 4-1: An individual Cricket
calculation with the radio and ultrasound. Figure 4-1 includes a photograph of a
Cricket.
4.1.2 Software and Capabilities
The software included with the Cricket distribution enables each individual Cricket to
serve as either a "beacon" or "listener" at any point in time. In a typical application,
beacons are programmed with their location and periodically broadcast timed radio
and ultrasound signals. By measuring the TDOA between the two messages, listeners
can approximate their range to the beacon, typically within 1-3 cm of error. In an
environment with several beacons, the Cricket software allows a mobile listener to
calculate its position in real time. Typical applications enabled by this technology
involve passive mobile agents that can benefit from location information.
Version 2 of the Cricket software distribution is written using TinyOS. TinyOS of-
fers a component based architecture and the ability to assemble complex applications
from stand-alone, reusable modules. The interactions between modules are governed
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by well-defined interfaces, and an event driven model allows for a single execution
thread that can be interrupted by hardware events that are serviced by dedicated
handler methods [4]. TinyOS is written in nesC, a language designed specifically to
support the component based architecture [5].
The Cricket distribution includes modules for communicating with a computer
over the serial port, controlling ultrasound broadcast and reception, and allowing
listeners to calculate ranges between themselves and beacons and multilaterate their
own position. Using the serial connection and a terminal program running on a per-
sonal or mobile computer, users can query a Cricket for its configuration and change
variables such as location and listener / beacon status. The cricketd application
included in the distribution can substitute for a terminal program on the personal
computer and serve as a conduit between a custom application and a Cricket.
4.2 Implementation
The implementation described in this section makes use of components included in
version 2.3.0 of the Cricket software distribution. Serving as a demonstration of the
path planning and threat avoidance algorithms detailed in Chapter 2, the implemen-
tation is primarily made up of custom nesC code written for the Crickets, but also
includes an application written in Java and running on a mobile computer. Iden-
tical code runs on all the Crickets, and they are configured at runtime to serve as
either a listener, a beacon, or a threat. Nearly all the Crickets are placed in listener
mode and make up a sensor network responsible for detecting threats and guiding
users through the field. One Cricket is connected to a mobile computer with a serial
cable, configured as a beacon, and travels with the user. The application running
on the mobile computer allows the user to request paths and provides an interface
for navigation. To support the demonstration, an arbitrary number of Crickets are
configured as threats and placed in the network to simulate the existence of threats
in a real world scenario.
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4.2.1 Functionality
The listener Crickets performs a variety of functions. For convenience, the application
defaults to recognizing the specific "threat" messages sent by the Crickets configured
as threats, although detection based on other factors such as temperature is also
possible. The group formation algorithm described in Chapter 2 is implemented, and
it is combined with the ability of each node to maintain a table of the approximate
locations of threats detected by the network. The path request / reply framework and
back propagation algorithm is supported, and the application includes a simplistic
survival probability model to evaluate the relative safety of paths. Once a path is
selected by the user, the nodes along the path can be "activated" and the user guided
along the path by the application running on the mobile computer. Details of how
these functions are implemented are offered in the Architecture section.
When configured as a beacon to travel with the mobile user, much of the listener
functionality is disabled. The beacon emits a timed ultrasound pulse and radio packet
approximately every two seconds, allowing each listener to calculate its distance from
the beacon and send that distance and its location back in a randomly timed reply
packet. Based on recent reports, the application running on the mobile computer pe-
riodically runs a multilateration algorithm to determine its own position. Although
the beacon does not participate in the threat detection process or forward path re-
quests or replies, it is able to originate path requests, receive the matching reply, and
instruct nodes making up the path to begin actively guiding the user.
4.2.2 Architecture
The functionality described above is implemented in a collection of TinyOS modules.
Each module offers one or more interfaces to its public functions and interacts with
lower level components provided by the TinyOS and Cricket software distributions.
For instance, the radio and time abstractions are utilized by nearly all the modules.
Here is an overview of the roles each of the modules play:
e ThreatDetectionM - supports threat detection and awareness,
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" PathPlanningM - implements the path request / reply framework and the back
propagation algorithm,
* StorageM - maintains the table of neighbors and associated midpoints, imple-
ments the survival probability model, and
* ExternalM - serves as the interface with the desktop application over the serial
port.
Details about the implementation of each of these components are offered in the
subsequent sections. Appendix A contains a module dependency diagram for the
software running on the Crickets, as well more detail about the interfaces each modules
provides and uses.
A collection of original message types are defined within the application to support
different functions. They are summarized in Table 4.1 and all fit within one packet.
In all cases, the application uses the TinyOS Active Message abstraction to broadcast
and receive messages over the radio. Within this framework, sending a message is a
split phase operation, and the processor can continue to do meaningful work while
waiting for a message to be broadcast. Handlers for receiving each type of message are
located throughout the modules. In instances where we intend to forward or modify
and forward a message (types TA, PRQ, PRP, PAT, and PA C), we are careful to avoid
race conditions where buffers could be accidently overwritten. This is accomplished
with a set of dedicated queues that allow us to compare the sequence numbers of
received messages to ensure we are not repeatedly forwarding the same message. The
queues support randomized hold times to avoid congestion and allow for the same
message to be sent an arbitrary number of times when necessary to improve reliability.
The mean and standard deviation of these hold times can be modified easily, and by
default are set to approximately 0.38 seconds and 0.07 seconds, respectively.
The implementation makes extensive use of the TimerC module offered by TinyOS.
TimerC allows for one-time and repeating timers that trigger an event upon expira-
tion. Individual instances of TimerC can be started and stopped depending on the
situation, and are used to schedule message sending, deletion of time sensitive data,
49
Type Function Data Included
LR Listener reply Listener location and distance to beacon
TM Threat detection Group leader / follower status and location
TA Threat awareness Threat location, leader ID, and sequence numbers
TTH Threat None (periodically sent by Cricket in threat mode)
PRQ Path request Path origin, destination, and sequence numbers
PRP Path reply Survival probability and IDs of path, ads to neighbors
PAT Path activation IDs of Crickets along path, sequence numbers
PA C Path clearing Sequence numbers
NMM Hello message Cricket location and midpoints (optional)
Table 4.1: Message types used in the implementation.
and routine calculations. Appropriately scheduled, the timers allow the processor to
manage its computational resources so it does not become overloaded.
The performance of the system is influenced by a collection of constants. They
are used to define the repeat intervals for timers, the size of data structures, and
other important factors. In this implementation, their values were chosen based on
the results of small tests to the system. The role and values of some of the most
important constants are summarized in Tables 4.2 and 4.3.
Description Value
Neighbor records 8
Neighbor pair midpoint-to-midpoint survival probability calculations 28
Advertisements to neighbors' midpoints in a path reply message 7
Threats each listener can be aware of 6
Crickets reporting a threat detection to a single leader 8
Table 4.2: Data structure sizes used in the implementation. Each value represents
the maximum number stored at any given time.
Description Value
Leader declaration countdown 4 - 5
Frequency to report detected threats to leader 5 - 6
Frequency leader announces threat position 8 - 9
Delay before relaying messages 0.25 - 0.5
Table 4.3: Time period constants used in the implementation. All values are in
seconds. In every case, time values are selected from a uniform distribution bounded
by the two constants.
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4.2.3 Threat Awareness
Threat awareness is accomplished in four phases: detection, group formation, location
estimation, and announcements. When a message of type TTH is received, the
listener Cricket updates its status. A timer responsible for managing group formation
within ThreatDetectionM fires periodically, and based on threat detection status
and whether the Cricket has heard a group leader broadcast recently, determines
whether to broadcast follower or leader detection (TM) messages. These messages
continue until the threat is no longer detected, at which point the Cricket broadcasts
a follower or leader bailout message. As specified in the group formation algorithm,
a randomized leader declaration timer begins once a leader bailout is received.
The group leader is responsible for performing location estimation and initiating
announcements. The leader maintains a table of the locations of any followers who
have also recently reported the threat. A dedicated timer manages the process of
calculating the centroid of all the locations and broadcasting an announcement. Using
the message queueing system discussed above, any Crickets within a specific radius
of the threat's location forward the announcement and store a record of the threat.
A maintenance timer periodically removes stale threat records. The size of detection
groups is limited to nine nodes (including the leader), and a Cricket can be aware of
a maximum of six threats at any time.
4.2.4 Survival Probability and Midpoint Shifting
The algorithms and data structures required to perform survival probability calcu-
lations are located in StorageM. When a Cricket receives a message of any type, it
updates a table with a time stamp and the one byte identification number and lo-
cation (if present in the message) of the neighbor who sent it. This neighbor table
supports up to eight records, and records with old time stamps are removed peri-
odically. Each Cricket broadcasts messages of type NMM approximately every five
seconds to ensure its neighbors are aware of its existence and location.
Using the table of threats, a method periodically calculates the survival probability
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associated with traveling between the midpoints of each pair of its neighbors. The
calculation for a pair of midpoints involves several steps. First, a value for survival
probability at each midpoint is calculated using a step function that approximates an
exponential. The function used in the implementation was chosen for simplicity and
is shown in Figure 4-2. The survival probabilities at the two endpoints are averaged
and the result is modified to reflect the ratio of the distance between the points to a
reference distance of 10 feet. A method for calculating the survival probability of a
path created by combining two smaller paths is included. It works by multiplying the
probabilities associated with the constituent paths. In order to support rapid path
replies, a table containing the survival probabilities between each pair of midpoints is
maintained by a method called by a timer. This table holds a maximum of 28 entries,
equivalent to one for each pair of at most eight neighbors.
0.9375 -
0.875
0.75
0.5
2
0 8 16 24 32 40
Radius (fet)
Figure 4-2: The survival probability function used in the implementation to approx-
imate an exponential.
When a Cricket is aware of fewer than two threats in the network, it chooses
the geometric midpoint of its location and each neighbor's location as the midpoint
for that neighbor. When two or more threats are detected, however, each Cricket
attempts to shift its midpoints to lie along the perpendicular bisector of the line
connecting the threat locations. These shifts only occur if the distance between the
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shifted location and the geometric midpoint is less than one half of the distance to
the neighbor. By imposing this limit, we avoid choosing unrealistic midpoints and
only shift in situations where the midpoint is likely to bisect two threats and form a
path. Examples of the effects of this algorithm are offered later.
4.2.5 Path Planning Algorithms
The PathPlanningM module contains the path search and construction functionality,
along with associated data structures and event handlers. Using messaging queues,
PRQ, PAT, and PA C messages are forwarded to reach the entire network after they
are initiated by the user. If a Cricket is within a specific distance of the destination
in a PRQ message, it initiates a reply by broadcasting a PRP message with its
own identification number in the path, a 100% survival probability and an array of
advertisements to the midpoints of each of its neighbors. Each advertisement contains
the one byte identification number of the neighbor and the survival probability from
the destination to the midpoint.
The intelligence of the back propagation algorithm is contained largely in the
modification and forwarding of PRP messages. Each Cricket maintains the optimal
(highest survival probability, or in event of a tie, smallest hop count) PRP message it
has forwarded in response to any path request. When a PRP message is received, the
Cricket first calculates the survival probability of the path to its midpoint using the
total accumulated survival probability of the path so far and the survival probability
to its midpoint contained in the advertisement. If there is no advertisement to the
receiving Cricket, the message is ignored. If, however, the reply is optimal, a set
of advertisements is built using records from the midpoint survival probability table
discussed in the previous section. As in the initial reply message, each advertisement
contains the one byte identification number of the neighbor and the survival prob-
ability to extend the path to that neighbor. If a survival probability record is not
found in the table, the calculation is done immediately. Finally, the Cricket appends
its own identification number to the path and inserts the message into a queue for
broadcast. To improve reliability, each Cricket broadcasts its optimal reply twice.
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The beacon Cricket traveling with the user maintains a record of its most recent
path request, and compares it with replies to ensure the optimal reply is stored. A
custom string is printed over the serial port whenever a new reply is received to inform
the application running on the mobile computer. At any point after the first reply
is received, the user may choose to initiate a PAT message and "activate" the series
of listener Crickets making up the reply. The significance of activation and its role
in user guidance is discussed in the next section. Once path traversal is complete, a
PA C message is initiated by the user and sent by the beacon to clear all activated
Crickets.
4.2.6 User Guidance
User guidance is accomplished through a combination of the mobile application and
the LR messages sent from the listeners to the beacon. The ExternalM module
converts received LR messages on the beacon into a formatted string that is sent to
the application over the serial port. The application includes a window displaying
a scaled representation of the listener Cricket locations gathered from LR messages.
Using a collection of the most recent of these messages, the application periodically
multilaterates and displays the position of the beacon (and thus the user). When
a set of listener Crickets involved in constructing a path are activated, they begin
including the coordinates of their two midpoints in their LR messages. As the user
travels from midpoint to midpoint and begins receiving LR messages from the next
Cricket, the application displays the next midpoint along the path. A screenshot of
the application is shown in Figure 4-3.
4.3 Performance Evaluation
Several tests of Cricket implementation were conducted in order to evaluate its per-
formance. This section presents results from those tests and observations about the
strengths and limitations of the implementation.
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Figure 4-3: A screenshot of the mobile application in use. The user has requested a
path from (46, 27) to (1, 41). The identification numbers of the Crickets along the
path, the user's current location, the path traversed so far, and the next midpoint
are labeled.
4.3.1 Test Setup
The tests were conducted using nineteen listener Crickets placed in random locations
on a gymnasium floor within a rectangle of 44 feet by 39 feet. Antennas were not
added to any of the Crickets to ensure that RF signal propagation would be limited.
The result was the creation of a multihop network with a diameter of approximately
4-5 nodes. The listener Crickets were assigned locations using a serial connection to
a mobile computer before they were placed, and had ample time to populate their
neighbor table and midpoint locations. The spatial density of the Crickets was 0.0111
per square foot. Twelve paths were requested using a Cricket configured in beacon
mode using its location as the origin of the path and a randomly selected location
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4.3.2 Results
The system proved to be very reliable, responding with a path after every request.
With only one source of path requests in the network, congestion was not an issue.
The latency between a request and the receipt of an optimal reply ranged from 1.37
seconds to 2.94 seconds, with an average over all the requests of 1.90 seconds and a
standard deviation of 0.52 seconds. The distance between the origin and destination
locations of the paths ranged from 29.5 feet and 55.3 feet, with an average of 42.3 feet
and a standard deviation of 7.7 feet. The average hop count of the optimal paths was
5.0. The correlation between latency and distance between the origin and destination
was 0.719.
Threats were represented by Crickets configured in "threat" mode and emitting
periodic TTH messages. For a threat placed at (28, 32) within the coordinate system
of the network, the discrepancy between of the centroid of the nodes detecting the
threat and the actual location was 2 feet. Seven listener Crickets reported a detection,
and ranged in distance to the threat from 3 feet to 17.7 feet. The discrepancy between
calculated and actual locations for a threat placed at (9, 9) was 2.24 feet. In this
case, six listener Crickets detected the threat, and ranged in distance from 3.2 feet to
13.5 feet.
The difference between paths found by the back propagation algorithm when one
threat was present and when none were present was significant. Figure 4-4 displays an
example of the response to a request from (46, 27) to (1, 41) with no threats present.
Each midpoint along the path is located exactly half way between the the locations
of the two nodes surrounding it. The path arrived 2.43 seconds after the request, a
period reflective of the 0.25 - 0.5 second hold times within the message queues for
PRQ and PRP messages and a hop count of 5 nodes.
With one threat located at (28, 32), an identical request resulted in the path
shown in Figure 4-5. The latency in this case was 2.24 seconds, a negligible difference
given the variance of the message queue hold times. As before, each midpoint is
56
50I II
Cricket Locations 0
Path -+-
Destination (1, 41)
- (2,41)
K(2, 35)
0 (15,27)
(3,29) (9,28)
(21,24)
0
0
0
0(28,21)
Origin (46, 27)
-...
(36, 24)
0
0 0,
10 20 30 40
X (feet)
Figure 4-4: A path formed from (46, 27)
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to (1, 41) in a network with no threats
and the listener Crickets along the path
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located exactly halfway between the locations of the two Crickets surrounding it.
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Figure 4-5: A path formed from (46, 27) to (1, 41) with one threat present in the
network. The coordinates of the midpoints and listener Crickets along the path are
labeled.
The presence of two threats in the network allows for an evaluation of the benefits
of midpoint shifting. With an additional threat placed at (9, 9), Crickets located
near the perpendicular bisector of the line connecting the threat locations shifted
their midpoints. This phenomenon is illustrated by the path shown in Figure 4-6.
The time required to discover the path was 2.94 seconds.
In this case, midpoint shifting generated an improvement when compared to a path
constructed from unshifted midpoint locations. In order to determine the magnitude
of the improvement, we evaluate the survival probability of each path using the threat
model presented in Chapter 2. We use a survival probability function of
s = 1 - e-3.84.r (4.1)
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Figure 4-6: A path formed from (43, 5) to (1, 41) with two threats present in the
network. The actual and calculated threat locations are shown. The coordinates of
the midpoints and listener Crickets along the path are labeled. The midpoint located
at (17, 19) was shifted from its default location of (21.5, 24), the midpoint located at
(26, 11) was shifted from its default location of (29, 15), and the midpoint located at
(8, 26) was shifted from its default location of (9, 28).
and one foot as the unit distance in order to approximate the threat model used in
the implementation. The survival probability of the entire path is determined by
multiplying the result of Equation 4.1 at one foot intervals along the path for each
threat. The result for the path containing shifted midpoints is 35.0%, while the result
for the path containing unshifted midpoints is 29.1%. In this instance, the midpoint
shifting algorithm offers an improvement of 35.0-29.1 = 20.2%. The path containing
unshifted midpoints is shown in Figure 4-7.
Given our the locations of the two threats and our threat model, we can also deter-
mine the ideal path through the continuous space covered by the network. The ideal
path maintains a course along the perpendicular bisector of the line connecting the
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Figure 4-7: A hypothetical path formed from (43, 5) to (1, 41) with two threats
present in the network and no midpoint shifting. The actual and calculated threat
locations are shown. The coordinates of the midpoints and listener Crickets along
the path are labeled.
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Figure 4-8: The optimal path from (43, 5) to (1, 41) with two threats present in the
network. The actual and calculated threat locations are shown and the points along
the path are labeled.
locations of the threats and is shown in Figure 4-8. Using the same process as before,
this path has a survival probability of 42.4%, representing a 20.7% improvement on
the path constructed from shifted midpoints.
4.3.3 Observations
The results presented above demonstrate the effectiveness of the implementation in
a controlled environment. Although the survival probability model used is relatively
simplistic, it allows the application to accurately compare the relative fitness of paths
and find the optimal one. We could imagine using survival probability function that
better approximates the exponential or is tuned for a different relationship between
users and threats, but the mechanics of the system remain the same. Similarly, the
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hold times of the message queues and the decision to broadcast some messages twice
improve reliability, but the specific constants may be changed in a different scenario.
The threat detection algorithms performed well in the tests, although more extensive
testing would be required to assess their accuracy when threats cover a region, rather
than a point.
Based on the specifications of the implementation and the tests that were con-
ducted, we can estimate several system properties. In both communication bandwidth
utilized and computation, the system can scale far larger than nineteen listener Crick-
ets. The frequency of certain timers play a large role in scalability. For instance, if
we were recomputing midpoint locations and survival probability records between
midpoints more frequently, we would not have as much processing time left for other
tasks. Although each listener Cricket currently supports replying to three simultane-
ous path requests, this limit is arbitrary and could be raised. Practically, however,
the communication traffic generated with too many requests would force request re-
sponse time to decrease. The average response time of 1.9 seconds observed in the
tests could be lowered by decreasing the message queue hold time, but at the expense
of lower throughput and a greater possibility that ideal paths would not reach the
requesting node.
4.4 Conclusion and Future Work
The implementation presented in this chapter demonstrates the practicality of the
design offered in Chapter 2. Although the survival probability model was not ideal,
and approximations were made in the code to improve efficiency, the system performed
reliably in tests. Ideal parameters for rebroadcasting and timing constants were not
able to be determined, but those used in the implementation yielded accurate results
with acceptable latency. In addition, the degree to which varied RF environments
impact the performance of the system is not known, but parameters could be modified,
perhaps at runtime, to accommodate different environments.
Larger tests and more analysis is needed to determine the impact of midpoint
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shifting and the back propagation algorithm in large scale networks or in situations
where the node density varies widely. In very large networks with high density, it
may make sense to explore the possibility of avoiding midpoint shifting and instead
filtering the set of nodes that are involved in back propagation. The decision to adopt
this strategy would be based on a desire to minimize contention for the broadcast
medium and scale more effectively in large networks. Although distinct from using
shifted midpoints to cover the search space, this tactic would address the same goal:
balancing efficiency with accuracy when constructing paths.
It is also possible that greater awareness of link quality on each node could help to
improve the performance of the application. Midpoints could be selected exclusively
from neighbors where connectivity surpassed a certain threshold. This step would
increase the odds of matching path advertisements with recipients and thus improve
the likelihood of optimal paths reaching the user. Of the issues discussed in the
section, the specific challenges of real world situations will determine which receives
the most attention.
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Appendix A
Implementation Architecture
The modules described in Chapter 4 interact with each other through a collection of
interfaces. Within TinyOS, each module can provide any number of interfaces and
use the interfaces of any other module. Table A.1 describes the interfaces provided
by StorageM, Table A.2 describes the interfaces provided by ThreatDetectionM, and
Table A.3 describes the interfaces provided by PathPlanningM. Figure A-1 contains
a dependency diagram for the modules and interfaces within the application.
Name Functionality
Printing data containing neighbors, threats, and
StorageMessage survival probability between midpoints
NeighborManagement Inserting and querying neighbor information,
including midpoint locations
ThreatManagement Inserting and querying threat information;
determining survival probability of paths
ActivationManagement Activating and deactivating paths;A__t__at_______gm__t querying midpoint locations to enable user guidance
Table A.1: Interfaces provided by StorageM
Name Functionality
ThreatMessage Printing data containing threat detection information
Table A.2: The interface provided by ThreatDetectionM
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Name Functionality
Printing records of received and forwarded path request,
reply, and activation messages
PathOperations Requesting, activating, and clearing activated paths
Table A.3: Interfaces provided by PathPlanningM
Serial
A ) B Module A provides interface B
A - o B Module A uses interface B
ExternalM
ThreatMessage PathMessage PathOperations
Threat r -trgmsae Atvto aaeet Path
DetectionM ActivationManagement PlanningM
StorageM
- NeighborManagement
SThreatManagement
RadioSend, RadioReceive, Time, Leds, Timer, CricketProperties
Figure A-1: A module dependency diagram for the implementation.
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